ASG Law

タグ: Behest Loans

  • Ombudsman’s Discretion vs. Probable Cause: When Does the Court Intervene in Anti-Graft Cases?

    The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the criminal complaint against several individuals for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The Court emphasized that while it generally respects the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable cause, it will intervene when there is a clear abuse of that discretion. This decision reinforces the importance of pursuing cases of alleged corruption, especially when there is sufficient basis to believe that a crime has been committed. Practically, this means that individuals accused of graft and corruption based on sufficient initial evidence cannot escape trial simply because the Ombudsman initially deemed the evidence insufficient. This ruling balances deference to prosecutorial discretion with the need for accountability and transparency in public service.

    Loans, Cronies, and Collusion: Was the DBP-Galleon Deal a Behest in Disguise?

    This case revolves around a loan extended by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to National Galleon Shipping Corporation (Galleon) during the Marcos regime. The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a complaint alleging that the loan was a “behest loan,” meaning it was granted under irregular circumstances, potentially involving cronyism and disadvantageous terms for the government. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause, finding the evidence presented by the PCGG to be insufficient. At the heart of the legal question is whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in failing to find probable cause based on the available evidence, including findings from the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans.

    The Supreme Court scrutinized the Ombudsman’s decision, guided by the principle that it typically refrains from interfering with the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause unless there is grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies an arbitrary or despotic exercise of judgment, essentially a lack of jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that a preliminary investigation aims to determine if there is a reasonable basis to believe a crime has been committed. This does not require absolute certainty or a full presentation of evidence for conviction, only facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed. The Court found the Ombudsman’s dismissal problematic because the PCGG had presented enough evidence to meet this threshold.

    Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean “actual or positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.

    The Court then delved into the elements of violating Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) involves a public officer acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence, causing undue injury to the government or giving unwarranted benefits to a private party. Section 3(g) concerns a public officer entering into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The Court noted that the PCGG presented evidence suggesting that the DBP loan to Galleon met these criteria, particularly through the findings of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. The Committee had identified several red flags, including Galleon’s undercapitalization, undercollateralization of the loan, and connections between Galleon’s major stockholders and President Marcos.

    Despite these concerns, the DBP granted Galleon’s request under conditions that were not met. Subsequently, instead of protecting its interests when Galleon defaulted, the DBP granted further accommodations, exacerbating the situation. The Ombudsman dismissed the TWG’s findings of the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay. But the Court refuted, citing the Estrada v. Ombudsman case, held that hearsay evidence is admissible in preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.The Court found this troubling, considering the high-ranking positions held by the individual respondents within both Galleon and DBP. Therefore, a comprehensive review of the facts should happen in a full-blown trial on the merits.

    This ruling has several important implications. First, it underscores that the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable cause is not absolute. The courts can and will intervene when there is a clear abuse of that discretion. Second, it reinforces the importance of thorough investigations into alleged behest loans and other forms of corruption. The Court’s decision emphasizes that even preliminary findings and reports can form a sufficient basis for establishing probable cause. Finally, it highlights that denials of liability or arguments about lack of participation are best addressed during trial, not as a basis for dismissing a complaint outright.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against the respondents for lack of probable cause in an alleged behest loan transaction.
    What is a behest loan? A behest loan is a loan granted under irregular circumstances, often involving cronyism or terms that are disadvantageous to the government, usually influenced by high government officials.
    What is probable cause? Probable cause refers to facts sufficient to create a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and that the individual in question is likely responsible. It doesn’t require absolute certainty but more than a mere suspicion.
    When can the Supreme Court interfere with the Ombudsman’s decisions? The Supreme Court can interfere when there is a grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman, meaning the decision was made arbitrarily or without a reasonable basis.
    What is Section 3(e) of RA 3019? Section 3(e) of RA 3019 pertains to a public officer acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence, causing undue injury to the government or unwarranted benefits to a private party.
    What is Section 3(g) of RA 3019? Section 3(g) of RA 3019 prohibits a public officer from entering into contracts or transactions on behalf of the government that are grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to it.
    Why did the Ombudsman dismiss the PCGG’s complaint initially? The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause, finding the evidence presented by the PCGG, which consisted mainly of executive summaries and technical reports, to be insufficient.
    What kind of evidence is admissible during preliminary investigation? In preliminary investigations, hearsay evidence is admissible because the investigation is preliminary and doesn’t finally adjudicate rights; however, the Court emphasized a substantial basis for crediting the same is needed.
    What was the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision? The Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence presented by the PCGG to establish probable cause, particularly considering the findings of the Ad Hoc Committee and the positions held by the respondents.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case serves as a reminder of the importance of holding public officials accountable for their actions and ensures that sufficient basis in preliminary investigations shall merit a full blown trial. It reinforces the principle that preliminary investigations are not mere formalities, and the Ombudsman’s discretion can be reviewed when there is an apparent error that causes the dismissal of possible legal remedies for anti-graft and corruption cases.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT vs. MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ, G.R. No. 194159, October 21, 2015

  • 職権濫用融資疑惑事件：オンブズマンの裁量権と予備的調査義務

    不正融資疑惑事件：オンブズマンは予備的調査を適切に行う義務がある

    [G.R. No. 148269, 2010年11月22日]

    はじめに

    フィリピンにおける政府系金融機関の不正融資、いわゆる「便宜的融資（Behest Loans）」は、国民の税金を不当に浪費し、経済に深刻な影響を与える重大な問題です。本判決は、大統領府不正融資特別委員会（Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans）が提起した、便宜的融資疑惑事件に関するオンブズマン（Ombudsman：監察官）の職務遂行の適法性を争ったものです。オンブズマンが、十分な調査を行わずに告発を却下したことの適否が争点となりました。最高裁判所は、オンブズマンには、告発内容を十分に検討し、必要な調査を行う義務があることを改めて明確にしました。

    法的背景：便宜的融資（Behest Loans）とは

    便宜的融資とは、政府高官の指示や影響力によって、通常の融資審査基準を逸脱して行われる融資を指します。多くの場合、担保不足、過小資本の企業への融資、返済能力の疑わしい企業への融資など、杜撰な融資条件が含まれます。これらの融資は、最終的に不良債権化し、政府系金融機関に巨額の損失をもたらし、国民の税金で補填されることになります。行政命令第13号および覚書命令第61号は、便宜的融資の定義を具体的に示しており、本件でもこれらの基準が適用されました。特に重要な便宜的融資の判断基準は以下の通りです。

    1. 担保不足であること
    2. 借り手企業が過小資本であること
    3. 政府高官による直接的または間接的な推奨があること
    4. 借り手企業の株主、役員、または代理人が取り巻きと特定されること
    5. 融資目的からの逸脱
    6. 企業構造の多層化
    7. 融資対象事業の実現可能性の欠如
    8. 異例な融資実行の速さ

    これらの基準は、便宜的融資を特定し、不正融資に関与した人物の責任を追及するために用いられます。便宜的融資は、汚職腐敗行為防止法（Republic Act No. 3019）第3条（e）項および（g）項に違反する犯罪行為となり得ます。

    汚職腐敗行為防止法第3条は、公務員の不正行為を以下のように規定しています。

    第3条 公務員の腐敗行為 – 既存の法律で既に処罰されている公務員の作為または不作為に加えて、以下の行為は公務員の腐敗行為を構成するものとし、ここに違法と宣言される。

    x x x x

    (e) 明らかな偏見、明白な悪意、または重大な過失により、その職務上の行政または司法上の職務の遂行において、政府を含むいかなる当事者にも不当な損害を与え、または私的当事者に不当な利益、有利性、または優先権を与えること。この規定は、免許または許可、その他の特権の付与を担当する官庁または政府系企業の役員および従業員に適用される。

    x x x x

    (g) 政府を代表して、政府にとって明白かつ著しく不利な契約または取引を締結すること。公務員がそれによって利益を得たか、または利益を得るか否かを問わない。

    本判決は、これらの条項の解釈と適用において、オンブズマンの役割の重要性を強調しています。

    事件の経緯：ずさんな融資とオンブズマンの対応

    本件は、ココ・コンプレックス・フィリピン社（CCPI）に対する国立投資開発公社（NIDC）の融資保証契約に関するものです。大統領府不正融資特別委員会は、この融資が便宜的融資に該当する疑いがあるとして、オンブズマンに刑事告発を行いました。告発状によると、CCPIは過小資本であり、担保も不十分であるにもかかわらず、NIDCから巨額の融資保証を受けました。融資審査の過程も異例の速さであり、便宜的融資の特徴が認められました。

    当初、オンブズマンは、告訴期間の経過を理由に告発を却下しましたが、最高裁判所はこれを覆し、予備的調査を行うよう命じました。しかし、再度の調査においても、オンブズマンは、告発状にNIDCの役員名が具体的に記載されていないこと、および関連文書が不足していることを理由に、再び告発を却下しました。委員会は、必要な文書を入手するために文書提出命令（Subpoena Duces Tecum）の発行を求めていましたが、オンブズマンはこれに応じませんでした。委員会は、オンブズマンのこの対応を不当として、Rule 65に基づく職権濫用に対する訴え（Certiorari Petition）を最高裁判所に提起しました。

    最高裁判所は、オンブズマンの告発却下は職権濫用にあたると判断し、原決定を破棄しました。判決の中で、最高裁は以下の点を指摘しました。

    • オンブズマンは、単に文書が不足しているという形式的な理由で告発を却下すべきではない。
    • 委員会が提出した証拠書類（融資契約書、内部報告書など）は、便宜的融資の疑いを十分に裏付けるものであった。
    • オンブズマンは、委員会が求めた文書提出命令を発行し、必要な証拠を収集する義務があった。
    • オンブズマンは、便宜的融資の疑いがある事案については、実質的な調査を行い、真相を解明すべきである。

    最高裁判所は、オンブズマンに対し、速やかに予備的調査を再開し、必要な文書の提出を命じ、関係者の主張を十分に検討した上で、改めて判断するよう命じました。

    実務上の教訓：オンブズマンの義務と企業の責任

    本判決は、オンブズマンの職務遂行における重要な教訓を示しています。オンブズマンは、単なる形式的な審査機関ではなく、国民の負託に応え、汚職腐敗を根絶するために、積極的に職務を遂行する義務があります。特に、便宜的融資のような国民経済に重大な影響を与える疑惑については、徹底的な調査を行い、真相を解明することが求められます。文書が不足している場合でも、文書提出命令などの権限を積極的に行使し、必要な証拠を収集すべきです。

    企業、特に政府系金融機関は、融資審査において、法令遵守と適正な手続きを徹底する必要があります。便宜的融資は、企業の信用を失墜させるだけでなく、関係者が刑事責任を問われる可能性もあります。融資審査プロセスの透明性を確保し、内部統制を強化することが重要です。

    重要なポイント

    • オンブズマンは、告発事件に対し、形式的な理由で却下するのではなく、実質的な調査を行う義務がある。
    • 便宜的融資の疑いがある事案については、特に慎重かつ徹底的な調査が求められる。
    • 企業は、融資審査において法令遵守と適正な手続きを徹底し、内部統制を強化する必要がある。

    よくある質問（FAQ）

    1. 便宜的融資とは具体的にどのような融資ですか？
      便宜的融資とは、政府高官の指示や影響力によって、通常の融資審査基準を逸脱して行われる融資のことです。担保不足、過小資本の企業への融資、返済能力の疑わしい企業への融資などが該当します。
    2. オンブズマンはどのような機関ですか？
      オンブズマンは、政府機関や公務員の不正行為を調査し、是正を勧告する独立機関です。国民からの苦情を受け付け、調査を行い、必要に応じて刑事告発や懲戒処分を求めます。
    3. 汚職腐敗行為防止法第3条（e）項と（g）項は、それぞれどのような行為を処罰対象としていますか？
      （e）項は、公務員が職務遂行において、不正な利益供与や不当な損害を与える行為を処罰対象としています。（g）項は、政府にとって著しく不利な契約や取引を締結する行為を処罰対象としています。
    4. 企業が便宜的融資に関与した場合、どのような責任を問われますか？
      便宜的融資に関与した企業や役員は、刑事責任（汚職腐敗行為防止法違反など）や民事責任を問われる可能性があります。また、企業の信用失墜は避けられません。
    5. 便宜的融資疑惑が発覚した場合、企業はどう対応すべきですか？
      直ちに内部調査委員会を設置し、事実関係を徹底的に調査する必要があります。法務専門家や会計専門家などの外部専門家の助言を得ながら、適切な対応策を検討・実施する必要があります。

    汚職・不正調査、企業コンプライアンスに関するご相談は、実績豊富なASG Lawにご連絡ください。当事務所は、マカティ、BGC、フィリピン全域で、企業法務に関するリーガルサービスを提供しております。お問い合わせページまたはkonnichiwa@asglawpartners.comまでお気軽にご連絡ください。




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  • State’s Right to Recover Ill-Gotten Wealth: Prescription Period Starts Upon Discovery of Offense

    The Supreme Court held that the prescriptive period for offenses related to the acquisition of behest loans, considered ill-gotten wealth, begins to run from the discovery of the commission of the offense, not from the date of the transaction itself. This ruling emphasizes the State’s right to recover unlawfully acquired properties, ensuring that those who benefited from illegal loans cannot evade prosecution by claiming the statute of limitations. This decision reinforces accountability and transparency in government transactions, aiming to prevent corrupt practices.

    Behest Loans: When Does the Clock Start Ticking on State Recovery?

    This case revolves around a complaint filed by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) against several individuals, including officers and board members of the National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), as well as stockholders and officers of Golden Country Farms, Inc. (GCFI). The Committee alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Sections 3(e) and 3(g), relating to corrupt practices of public officers.

    The crux of the issue lies in determining when the prescriptive period for these offenses begins. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, arguing that the offenses had already prescribed since more than ten years had elapsed from the time of their commission. The Committee, however, contended that the prescriptive period should be counted from the time of discovery of the behest loans, which was sometime in 1992 when the Committee was constituted. Section 3(e) involves causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving unwarranted benefits to any private party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Section 3(g) prohibits a public officer from entering into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government that is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that for offenses involving the acquisition of behest loans, it was virtually impossible for the State to have known about the violations at the time the transactions were made. This is because public officials often conspire with the beneficiaries of the loans. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the commission of the offense, not from the day of the commission itself. Building on this principle, the Court cited prior jurisprudence, highlighting that in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense, which occurred in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.

    Building on this precedent, the Court considered the allegations regarding violations of Section 3(e) and Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, breaking it down into pre-takeover and post-takeover transactions. With respect to the pre-takeover transactions, the Court explained that a Section 3(e) violation requires injury caused by giving unwarranted benefits to private parties who conspire with public officers, while Section 3(g) does not require such benefits, focusing instead on transactions grossly disadvantageous to the government. For the post-takeover transactions, only a violation of Section 3(g) would be applicable, because, after the government had taken over GCFI, the element of private party unwarranted benefits under 3(e) disappeared.

    The court criticized the Ombudsman’s failure to properly resolve the issues, stating that the lack of injury suffered by the Government was erroneously based solely on the takeover. At the very least, the unpaid loans were indicative of damage suffered. More importantly, the Court stated that “injury to the Government is only required to support a charge under Section 3(e), but not under Section 3(g), of R.A. No. 3019.” Ultimately, the role of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations is simply to determine if there is sufficient probable cause for bringing an indictment against a suspect.

    The Court further stated, “By this standard, the Court finds probable cause to bind over private respondents to stand trial for the offenses charged, except for Placido L. Mapa, Jr. whom the Government had committed to exclude as party defendant or respondent in all PCGG-initiated civil cases and criminal proceedings or investigations in exchange for his having provided information relating to the prosecution of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act cases against the Marcoses in New York.”

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was determining when the prescriptive period begins for offenses involving the acquisition of behest loans, considered as ill-gotten wealth, specifically whether it starts from the date of the transaction or from the date of discovery of the offense.
    What is a behest loan? A behest loan generally refers to a loan granted under questionable circumstances, often characterized by being undercollateralized, involving cronies, or having the endorsement of high-ranking government officials.
    What is Republic Act No. 3019? Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes corrupt practices by public officers, including causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits to private parties.
    What did the Ombudsman decide in this case? The Ombudsman initially dismissed the complaint, stating that the offenses had already prescribed because more than ten years had passed since the time of their commission and they deemed the Government did not suffer an injury.
    How did the Supreme Court rule? The Supreme Court reversed the Ombudsman’s decision, ruling that the prescriptive period should be counted from the discovery of the offenses, not from the date of the transactions. This was because it was improbable for the State to discover these transactions on their own in the presence of collusion.
    What is the significance of the 1986 EDSA Revolution in this case? The 1986 EDSA Revolution is significant because the Court has ruled that for offenses committed before this event, the counting of the prescriptive period commences from the date of discovery of the offense after the revolution.
    Who was Placido L. Mapa, Jr. and why was he excluded? Placido L. Mapa, Jr. was one of the respondents but he was excluded because he had an agreement with the Government where he agreed to provide crucial information relating to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act cases against the Marcoses.
    What is the difference between Section 3(e) and Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019? Section 3(e) involves causing undue injury to any party or giving unwarranted benefits to private parties, while Section 3(g) prohibits a public officer from entering into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the same, without a requirement to demonstrate that the government was unduly injured.

    This ruling clarifies the computation of the prescriptive period for offenses related to behest loans, affirming the State’s right to recover ill-gotten wealth. It underscores the importance of due diligence and accountability in government transactions, serving as a deterrent against corruption and abuse of power. This decision provides a clear framework for future cases involving similar issues, ensuring that public officials are held accountable for their actions and the State’s resources are protected.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, G.R. No. 135703, April 15, 2009